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Introduction
Unpopular wars inevitably lead to sharp conflicts between presidents and the press over
the control of secret information. National security secrets find their way into print
because government officials assigned to carry out questionable policies leak secret
documents to reporters. The government responds to publication with threats of civil
legal action and criminal prosecution. The Vietnam War produced the Pentagon Papers
case in which the government unsuccessfully sought a prior restraint on the publication of
a classified history of the Vietnam War. Now, Iraq-related cases have led to jail for some
reporters, threats of jail for others and warnings of criminal prosecution for still others.1
These cases, taken together, threaten to criminalize newsgathering of national security
secrets.
During these times of national security stress, journalists find that their professional ethic
sometimes requires them to employ newsgathering techniques that may be extra-legal
and extra-constitutional – that is, not clearly protected by law or the Constitution.
Reporting national security secrets and protecting the sources who leak them provide
citizens with information often essential to judging the wisdom and legality of
government policy. When Congress is controlled by the party of the president and is not
providing robust checks on executive power, the press’ extra-legal and extraconstitutional activity in reporting questionable but secret government activity provides
an especially important check on presidential overreaching. Under these circumstances,
the press is arguably the most effective constitutional check on executive abuse.
Journalists like to believe that they enjoy constitutional and legal protection for these
essential newsgathering functions. In fact, they enjoy far less legal protection than they
realize. Neither Congress nor the U.S. Supreme Court has provided journalists with legal
or constitutional protection for these important methods of newsgathering. Meanwhile,
White House and other national security officials routinely exaggerate the danger of
publication of secret information. Over the decades, government officials have presented
scant proof of harm. In a perfect First Amendment world, with a Supreme Court
composed of nine Justice Brennans, such important activities of newsgathering and
dissemination would have legal and constitutional protection. But given the legal
landscape, the legal limbo of the status quo is preferable to the legal certainty that would
further hinder important newsgathering.
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In their seminal work2 on the Espionage statutes, Edgar and Schmidt wrote that the nation
had lived in a state of “benign indeterminacy about the rules of law governing defense
secrets” since World War I.3 In addition, Edgar and Schmidt concluded that sections of
the Espionage Act, if read literally, could apply to the publication of secrets, although the
poorly drafted law could fall to modern-day First Amendment doctrine.4 Edgar and
Schmidt wrote at the time of the Pentagon Papers case, but the intervening three decades
have done little to alter this state of benign indeterminacy. The possibility of a
prosecution under the Espionage Act remains alive partly because of unfortunate dicta in
Justice White’s concurring opinion (joined by Justice Stewart) in the Pentagon Papers
case stating that he would have “no difficulty sustaining convictions” under the
Espionage Act.5 The recent Espionage Act prosecution of lobbyists for the American
Israel Public Affairs Committee, AIPAC, for their information-gathering activities
heightens concern that the Espionage Act could be turned against reporters’ informationgathering.6
Nevertheless, reporters have fared well during the long era of uncertainty. No reporter
has been prosecuted for disclosing national security secrets in the 200-year history of the
nation. When reporters are jailed for refusing to reveal their sources the jailings are
usually brief and pro forma. A study by the Reporters’ Committee for Freedom of the
Press found that 17 journalists were jailed between 1984 and 1998 for refusing to reveal
their sources. None of the 17 was jailed for more than a month; nine did not serve a day.7
More recently, a few journalists have spent longer periods in jail, notably Judith Miller of
the New York Times, who served 85 days, and Josh Wolf, a freelance blogger who has
served more than 130 days.
This article argues that the press – and by extension the public – is better served by a
continuation of the state of uncertainty than by bright line rules. Recent attempts by the
press to argue in favor of an extravagant reporter’s privilege have backfired, partly
because of unfavorable facts and partly because media lawyers have overstated the law.8
As a result it is apparent that judges are likely to draw bright lines where they do not
protect important newsgathering methods that journalists believe they are duty-bound to
employ. Journalists will be faced with a few situations in which they make an ethical
decision to protect an unnamed source and to print a national security secret even when
those courses may not be protected by the law. In these situations, editors, reporters and
publishers need to do a better job than in the past of explaining their ethical decisions.
They need to face the fact that they are engaging in an act of civil disobedience for which
they must accept the legal consequences.
2

Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, The Espionage Statutes and Publication of Defense Information, 73
Colum. L. Rev. 929 (1973).
3
Id. at 936.
4
Id. at 1031-57.
5
New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 737 (1971).
6
United States v. Rosen, Case No. 1:05cr225, (E.D.Va. Aug. 6, 2006).
7
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I. Communications gap
There is a yawning communications gap between journalists and national security
officials when it comes to printing national security secrets. Journalists believe with all
their hearts that that the First Amendment clothes them with a constitutional entitlement
to print national security secrets and to stay out of jail while protecting the confidential
sources who leaked the secrets. They believe that this same First Amendment body
armor exempts them from prosecution other citizens might face under the Espionage Act.
They say that jailing journalists chills the publication of information that citizens have a
right to know. To them, the relationship between reporter and source is every bit as
sacrosanct as the relationship between lawyer and client, priest and confessor,
psychiatrist and patient. They believe that their disclosure of national security secrets is
synonymous with the public interest - patriotic even – and provides the public with
information that is the meat and potatoes of the stew of democracy. They believe that
journalists – not intelligence officials or judges – should decide when to publish a
national security secret. They believe that government officials can’t be trusted to decide
what information should be kept secret because they are genetically prone to overclassify
and to use classification to hide embarrassing information about wrongdoing.
Meanwhile, government officials, especially in the secrecy-prone Bush administration,
argue the diametric opposite. They argue that there is no legal privilege that reporters can
invoke to protect their confidential sources. They say the First Amendment doesn’t place
journalists above the law when it comes to testifying like any other citizen about crimes
they witnessed. They say reporters may be subject to prosecution under the Espionage
Act, even if those reporters thought their disclosures were patriotic rather than
treasonous, even if the reporting was so important that it won a Pulitzer Prize, and even
though there never has been a reporter prosecuted under the act. They say there is no
evidence that jailing journalists chills First Amendment rights because there is no First
Amendment right to publish top secret information. They believe that the protection of
secrets is synonymous with the public interest and that disclosure risks American lives.
They believe that trained intelligence agents, not untrained reporters, should decide when
it is safe to tell the American people about secrets. And they say that the reporter-source
relationship does not have the deep roots of the lawyer-client or priest-confessor
relationship, nor does it need any help from the Constitution to survive.
Both sets of claims are extravagant. The courts do not recognize a First Amendment
right of journalists to protect confidential sources and there is little evidence that the
publication of national security secrets has been chilled by jailing noted journalists and
threatening to prosecute others. To the contrary, two important stories reporting national
security secrets – The New York Times’ disclosure of warrantless domestic wiretapping
and the Washington Post’s disclosure of secret CIA prisons in eastern Europe - occurred
in the wake of Times journalist Judith Miller serving 85 days in jail. (Journalists also will
confess privately that there are few things better for a journalist’s career than being put in
jail for protecting a source.) Although journalists claim to be doing the people’s business,
they are arguing for a protected status that no citizen can claim. By asserting that the
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public should leave it up to the press to decide when to publish national security secrets,
journalists are laying claim to a decision for which they have no special expertise or
training.
As for the claims of administration officials, there is scant evidence that national security
has been harmed in any significant way by the disclosure of government secrets. The 11
“drop dead” secrets that the government cited9 in its unsuccessful attempt to stop the
publication of the Pentagon Papers were more compelling than the vague generalities
offered by the current administration in its criticism of the NSA wiretapping and CIA
prison stories. Yet there never has been evidence that either the Pentagon Papers or the
recent disclosures cost American lives or hurt U.S. security. What is demonstrated by
history as far back as the Pentagon Papers and before is that the government engages in a
vast amount of overclassification, hiding damaging information that it mishandled the
Vietnam War and that it tapped domestic telephone conversations of Americans without
warrants. The administration’s threat to apply the Espionage Act to recent disclosures of
national security secrets flies in the face of the legislative history of the law, which shows
Congress sought to keep the president from censoring the press.10
A. First Amendment is a porous shield for reporters
When the press reports a sensitive national security secret, the government has three
options, each of which involves a distinct legal analysis and different political
consequences. One option is for the government to seek to obtain an injunction against
publication as the Nixon administration sought to do to stop publication of the Pentagon
Papers. A second option is to prosecute the journalists and sources for violating the
Espionage Act, which provides criminal penalties. The third option is to subpoena the
reporter to appear before a grand jury and force him or her to disclose the source of
information. The prior restraint option is almost certain to fail because of the heavy
burden of proof that the Pentagon Papers case places on the government – “direct,
immediate and irreparable harm.”11 Government attempts to stop the presses from
running also are a political loser in times of high-volume dissent. The Bush
administration’s apparent decision not to seek a prior restraint of the NSA or CIA prisons
stories suggests that this option is highly unlikely to be employed in the future. An
Espionage Act prosecution also seems unlikely because no reporter has been prosecuted
under the law, and the political consequence would be substantial. That means that the
lever the government is most likely to employ is the grand jury investigation to force a
journalist to disclose the source or go to jail. In this arena, the journalist’s protection is
limited and uncertain and the political consequences for prosecutors are minimal, judging
from past cases. Neither the Judith Miller nor Josh Wolf jailing resulted in heavy public
pressure to free the journalists.

9
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1. Little First Amendment protection for a reporter’s privilege
To most journalists, the obligation to protect the identity of a confidential source is more
than a contractural one growing out of the promise extended by the reporter. It is also
more than an ethical obligation. It is an almost sacred obligation. Reporters learn
quickly in places such as the nation’s capital that public officials almost never say
anything interesting and newsworthy unless they are speaking under some confidentiality
agreement. Certainly, sources of national security secrets never reveal important
information unless they are promised anonymity.
Despite the threatening words of the statutes and the unfavorable court decisions,
journalists continue to operate under the belief that their publication of national security
secrets is protected by the First Amendment. At times, this view is expressed in such a
fashion that that Howard Simons and Joseph Califano once opined that journalists
“believe the First Amendment places them in a constitutionally elite class.”12
During the three decades after the 1972 Branzburg v. Hayes 13 decision, journalists and
their lawyers successfully turned their 5-4 loss into a victory through clever lawyering.
Media lawyers essentially argued that even though Justice Lewis Powell had joined the
majority in rejecting a reporter’s privilege, his concurring decision should be read
together with the dissent to create a limited constitutional privilege. Ironically, the
court’s decision not to recognize a constitutional basis for the reporter-source privilege
resulted in reporters getting more protection than they had before the defeat. At the time
of Branzburg, 17 states had shield laws; since Branzburg another 14 state have passed
laws and 17 other states provide some judicial protection.14 Three decades after
Branzburg, First Amendment lawyers had been so successful in persuading states to
adopt shield laws or their judicial equivalent that they had convinced themselves that the
decision had actually created a qualified privilege for a journalist to withhold the name of
confidential sources.
In the past several years, however, judges have actually read Branzburg and refused to
recognize this reporter’s privilege. As New York Times attorney George Freeman put it:
“Branzburg has been reread and interpreted differently than the 25 years before.”15 The
press and media lawyers have improvidently contributed to the run of bad decisions by
relying on test cases with unfavorable facts. The prime example was the Judith Miller
case involving a flawed heroine. Instead of exercising caution when the Valerie Plame
leak surfaced, leading newspapers, including The New York Times, called for a criminal
investigation of the leak. The Times ignored its long-standing editorial opposition to leak
investigations giving this rationale: “As members of a profession that relies heavily on
the willingness of government officials to defy their bosses and give the public vital
information, we oppose ''leak investigations'' in principle. But that does not mean there
12

Howard Simons & Joseph A. Califano Jr., eds., The Media and the Law, 1 (1976).
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can never be a circumstance in which leaks are wrong -- the disclosure of troop
movements in wartime is a clear example.”16
The analogy was inapt. Just about everyone – lawyer, journalist, judge – agrees that the
press must not disclose troop movements that would endanger soldiers’ lives. Alexander
Bickel, attorney for the Times in the Pentagon Papers case, conceded to Justice Stewart
that there could be a prior restraint of publication if the court were convinced that the
disclosure of the papers would result in 100 American prisoners being executed. Bickel
said, “I am afraid that my inclinations to humanity overcome the somewhat more abstract
devotion to the First Amendment.”17 But the leak of the name of CIA agent Valerie
Plame hardly posed that kind of risk. Ms. Plame was safe in Washington D.C. rather than
off on a battlefield or working covertly overseas. The suspected leaker in the Plame case
also was less of a sympathetic character than in the conventional leak case. In most leak
cases the leaker is a whistleblower disclosing potential government wrongdoing. In the
Plame case the leak was from a potential government wrongdoer in the president’s or
vice president’s office possibly attempting to punish a whistleblower – Ms. Plame’s
husband Joseph Wilson - who had challenged government wrongdoing. On top of that,
Ms. Miller had herself been complicit in the very wrongdoing at issue – distorting
evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Ms. Miller has written stories about
nonexistent weapons of mass destruction in the run-up to the war. Finally, Ms. Miller
and the other reporters involved in the case were the only witnesses to the alleged crime
under investigation – disclosure of the name of a covert source. Even the proposed
national shield law, inspired in part by the Miller case, would require testimony under
these circumstances. It provides for disclosures that are in the public interest and that are
“directly relevant to the question of guilt or innocence.”18 For that reason, it would not
have kept Miller out of jail had it been enacted before the events transpired.
Despite Ms. Miller’s flaws as a heroine and the other unfavorable facts of the case, the
press and media lawyers eagerly embraced her. A detached observer has to wonder if
psychological motivations of the actors interfered with a cool, legal analysis. Ms. Miller
may have hoped to rehabilitate her sagging reputation by playing the role of heroine.
Times attorney Floyd Abrams may have hoped for another great Pentagon Papers-style
win in the Supreme Court and Arthur Sulzberger Jr. may have wished to match his
father’s triumph as a standard bearer of the First Amendment. Finally, one has wonder
whether a press establishment that had been burned by the administration’s
misinformation on weapons of mass destruction was eager to see perpetrators of the
misinformation, such as the vice president’s aide L. “Scooter” Libby, pay for mistakes.
What too few reporters appreciated was that in criminalizing Mr. Libby’s leak they were
essentially criminalizing newsgathering.
Whatever the motivations, the results were disastrous for the press. The D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals rejected the argument that Branzburg should be read to create a limited
First Amendment privilege of reporters to shield confidential sources. The Times had
16
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argued that the lower court judge was “flatly wrong” in holding there was no First
Amendment privilege for a news reporter; Judge Sentelle stated flatly, “the appellants are
wrong.”19 The Times had echoed the arguments made by media lawyers after Branzburg,
that Justice Powell’s concurring opinion had recognized some instances in which
journalists could go to court to contest subpoenas to testify.20 But Judge Sentelle pointed
out that Justice Powell had joined the majority opinion in Branzburg, and limited a
journalist’s recourse to court to instances of bad faith on the part of prosecutors.21
Clearly, there would be few cases where reporters could show bad faith by prosecutors.
Judge Tatel’s concurring opinion recognized a limited, common law privilege of a
reporter to protect a confidential source.22 This common law privilege would require the
courts to balance the importance of disclosing the information with the importance of
keeping it from being disclosed.23 Judge Tatel wrote that judges “must weigh the public
interest in compelling disclosure, measured by the harm the leak causes, against the
public interest in newsgathering, measured by the leak’s information value.”24
He concluded that on balance the common law privilege did not protect Miller.25
Well after Ms. Miller had departed the Times, James Goodale, the Times lawyer of
Pentagon Papers fame, was continuing to claim that Miller’s 85-day stint in jail was a
great service on behalf of the First Amendment right to protect confidential sources.26
Actually, the case revealed the weakness of the First Amendment argument on behalf of
protecting confidential sources. More broadly, the Plame investigation had the effect of
criminalizing newsgathering. Miller spent time in jail, even if she was not there on for a
crime. In addition, a top aide to the vice president, Mr. Libby, is under criminal
prosecution for allegedly lying about the details of his conversations with reporters.
Many reporters may secretly have enjoyed seeing Mr. Libby prosecuted for a dirty trick
on Ms. Plame and Mr. Wilson. But there was nothing here to cheer about from the
vantage point of protecting the essential relationship between reporter and confidential
source.
The Judith Miller affair wasn’t the only one in which the press hurt its own cause. Judge
Posner’s devastating opinion on the reporter’s privilege in McKevitt v. Pallasch,27 came
in a case that never should have made it to the appeals court because the reporters’
arguments were so weak. Abdon Pallasch and Robert C. Herguth of the Chicago SunTimes and Flynn McRoberts of the Chicago Tribune were ordered in July, 2006 to turn
over tapes of conversations with an FBI informant, David Rupert. Rupert, an American
truck driver, had been a spy for the FBI in its investigation of the Real IRA, an Irish
terrorist group. The tapes of conversations between the reporters and Rupert were
subpoenaed by lawyers for Michael McKevitt, an accused terrorist leader. McKevitt’s
19
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lawyers wanted the tapes to prepare for cross-examining Rupert during McKevitt’s trial
in Ireland. The reporters sought to quash the subpoena, citing Branzburg. A federal
district court judge ordered the tapes produced. The journalists appealed, asking the 7th
Circuit to stay the production order. It refused and the tapes were produced. Attorneys
for the journalists had hoped that would end the case, but Judge Posner, noting that the
production of the tapes mooted any appeal,28 issued an opinion explaining the panel’s
decision. Judge Posner used the occasion to express his skepticism about a reporter’s
privilege rooted in the First Amendment. “A large number of cases conclude, rather
surprisingly in light of Branzburg, that there is a reporter’s privilege, though they do not
agree on its scope,” he wrote. “Some of the cases that recognize the
privilege…essentially ignore Branzburg, …some treat the ‘majority’ opinion in
Branzburg as actually just a plurality opinion,…some audaciously declare that Branzburg
actually created a reporter’s privilege.”29 In those few short sentences, Judge Posner
managed to undercut decisions recognizing a reporter’s privilege in 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 9th
Circuits.30 The 7th Circuit decision was disastrous not just because the press lost or that
the opinion was written by an especially influential judge. The decision was disastrous
because it was fought on losing legal terrain that didn’t need to be held. The identity of
the source was known, not confidential; the reporters, not the source, sought to withhold
information; the reporters’ motive was not to protect sources of information but to protect
their scoop for the commercial advantage31 of a book they were writing.
This is not to say that the press and its lawyers should simply surrender notes and names
of confidential sources to inquiring government lawyers. Since the legal defeat of the
Judith Miller case, the number of subpoenas to reporters for confidential source
information has mushroomed. Eve Burton, general counsel for Hearst Corp., says that
her company received 80 newsgathering subpoenas for its broadcast stations, newspapers
and magazines from mid-2005 until the end of 2006.32 In the years before the Judith
Miller decision, Hearst received so few newsgathering subpoenas that it didn’t keep
track.33
The press is mounting a smart challenge to the leak investigation in the Balco steroids
case. A court order now on appeal to the 9th Circuit would send two San Francisco
Chronicle reporters to jail for up to 18 months and fine the newspaper $1,000 a day as
long as the reporters and paper refuse to reveal the source of grand jury information that
led to stories about the Barry Bonds-Jason Giambi steroids scandal. The facts of that
case are much more favorable to the press than the facts in the Judith Miller or McKevitt
cases. The Chronicle stories revealed wrongdoing by figures of great public note, led to
a congressional investigation and to reforms in baseball. In addition, the leak of grand
jury transcripts occurred not during the investigative stage but after indictments. This is
not to say that the government has no interest in protecting grand jury transcripts after
28
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indictment or that those investigated but not charged have no interest in protecting their
good names. Yet the interest in protecting disclosure would seem less after indictment
than before.
The amicus brief filed by the nation’s news organizations avoids First Amendment
doctrine, instead making the common law case for a reporter’s privilege.34 The brief
argues that “reason and experience,” demonstrate that “protecting confidential
newsgathering from governmental interference dates back to the nation’s founding.”35
The brief cites the famous Peter Zenger case from the Colonial period as the first in
which a journalist protected confidential sources at threat of jail. Instead of arguing that
Branzburg guarantees a First Amendment right to protect sources, the brief argues that
the passage of shield laws in reaction to Branzburg reflects the development of a
common law privilege. The brief bases this argument on Jaffee v. Redmond36 in which
the Court recognized a common law privilege for psychotherapists to protect the
confidences of patients. Before Jaffee the Court had limited the development of common
law to state court law decisions. But in Jaffee the Court wrote that adoption of state
statutes could be considered as part of the development of a common law privilege.37
Under the line of reasoning in the brief, the post-Branzburg court decisions recognizing a
reporter’s privilege are not misreadings of Branzburg but instead evidence – along with
state shield laws - of the development of a common law privilege. The news
organizations do not argue that this privilege is absolute, but rather that it requires a judge
to engage in a balancing like that suggested by Judge Tatel in the Miller case.
One way to strengthen the protection of journalists reporting national security secrets
would be to extend to the reporter’s privilege cases the tough legal standard that the U.S.
Supreme Court applied to prior restraints in the Pentagon Papers case. Justice Stewart’s
opinion in the Pentagon Papers required that the government show that disclosure would
cause “direct, immediate and irreparable harm to our Nation or its people.”38 Early
versions of the proposed federal shield law - the Free Flow of Information Act contained language requiring “imminent and actual harm to national security” before a
reporter could be required to disclose a confidential source. But the current version39 has
a weaker standard: whether the disclosure “seriously damaged the national security" and
whether "the harm caused by the unauthorized disclosure of properly classified
Government information clearly outweighs the value to the public of the disclosed
information."40 This balancing test would not necessarily protect the New York Times
reporters who wrote the NSA story, or the Washington Post reporter who wrote the CIA
prisons story. Nor would Judith Miller have been protected in the Plame case. In
criminal cases, such as the Plame investigation, the bill provides for disclosures that are
in the public interest and that are “directly relevant to the question of guilt or
34
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innocence.”41 Ms. Miller’s conversations with Mr. Libby were relevant to the question of
guilt. In other words, as fervently as the press may wish for passage of the national
shield bill, the legislation may not provide protection in the most important and
controversial situations.
There also could be unintended consequences from passage of a shield law. The
definition of journalist in the bill42 would not include a blogger who didn’t work for a
news organization. For that reason, it would not help someone such as Josh Wolf, who,
by the beginning of 2007 had spent more than 130 days in jail for refusing to turn over
outtakes of a video he posted on his blog showing an anarchist rally at which a police
officer was injured. Because the national shield law draws lines between who is and is
not a journalist, it borders on the licensing of journalists, a dangerous path for the press.
The same congressional hand that extends protections to journalists can take them away.
2. The Threat of the Espionage Act
Edgar and Schmidt demonstrated that the words of the Espionage Act, passed by the
World War I Congress, can literally be interpreted to prosecute journalists for divulging
national defense secrets, with the current sections 793(d) and (e) posing the greatest
threat to reporters and newspapers.43 The provisions make it a crime for those “lawfully
having possession of”44 or “having unauthorized possession of”45 information relating to
the national defense to willfully communicate or retain it. As Edgar and Schmidt put it:
“If these statutes mean what they seem to say and are constitutional, public speech in this
country since World War II has been rife with criminality. The source who leaks defense
information to the press commits an offense; the reporter who holds onto defense
material commits an offense; and the retired official who uses defense material in his
memoirs commits an offense.”46 Put another way, the front pages of the New York Times,
Washington Post and Los Angeles Times arguably contain information several times a
week the dissemination of which violates a literal reading of the Espionage Act.
Edgar and Schmidt concluded that “the legislative record is reasonably clear that a broad
literal reading was not intended”47 in light of Congress’ decision to cut out proposed
provisions that would have permitted the Wilson administration to administer a system of
press censorship. Nevertheless, comment in the Congressional debate suggests that
members of Congress were aware of the implications of the broad language. In the brief
debate on this portion of the law, Sen. Cummins pointed out that all citizens would be
required to provide government officials with any defense information they had
collected; otherwise they would be guilty of retaining it in violation of the law.48 Sen.
Cummins was trying to persuade the Senate to strike the retention offense for its breadth.
41
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To make his point he posed the hypothetical of an Iowa man who knew how many
bushels of wheat and corn had been raised in that state. Wasn’t it wrong, Sen. Cummins
argued to force this Iowa man to disclose the information to an authorized official
because it related to national defense? Other senators agreed with Sen. Cummins’ broad
interpretation of the language but refused to eliminate it from the statute.49
No reporter or news organization has been prosecuted under the Espionage Act in almost
a century since passage. Nor has any person not a government official been convicted of
violating the law. But that history is not reason for news organizations to be complacent
in light of the AIPAC prosecution and a press statement by Attorney General Gonzales.
The attorney general - asked about prosecuting news organizations for press accounts of
the government’s secret monitoring of international banking transactions - said, “There
are some statutes on the book, which, if you read the language carefully, would seem to
indicate that there is a possibility.”50 The attorney general added that, "We are engaged
now in an investigation about what would be the appropriate course of action in that
particular case….”51
The prosecution of two former lobbyists for the pro-Israeli group AIPAC magnifies the
worries. If convicted, Steven J. Rosen and Keith Weissman would be the first people
who were not government officials found guilty under the law. They received
information from a Pentagon official relating to U.S. policy options in the Middle East,
an FBI report on the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia and Al-Qaida activities.
The lobbyists relayed the information to an official at the Israeli embassy and to a
Washington Post reporter.52 If lobbyists practicing their First Amendment rights can be
convicted of receiving national defense secrets, then why wouldn’t journalists practicing
their First Amendment rights be as vulnerable?
The outcome of the AIPAC prosecution and its import for journalists depend in part on
another case lingering from a prior political era – the lawsuit by Rep. John A. Boehner,
R-Ohio, against Rep. James McDermott, D-Wash., for leaking to the press a tape of a
conversation about an ethics investigation of former House Speaker Newt Gingrich. A
couple from Florida had taped the cell phone conversation that included statements by
Rep. Boehner. The couple turned over the tape to Rep. McDermott, who was on the
ethics committee. Rep. McDermott contacted reporters for the New York Times and
Atlanta Constitution and allowed them to hear the tape, excerpts of which were published
in both papers.53 A three-judge panel of the D.C. Court of Appeals twice has decided that
Rep. McDermott violated 18 U.S.C. § 2511(a)(c) by disclosing a conversation illegally
intercepted by the couple; the first decision54 was vacated55 by the U.S. Supreme Court in
light of Bartnicki v. Vopper.56 Bartnicki involved the same wiretapping statute as
49
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Boehner. The Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment protected a person who
disclosed information lawfully received from a person who obtained the information
illegally.57 In Boehner II, the D.C. Circuit distinguished Bartnicki pointing out that Rep.
McDermott knew the identity of the people who illegally obtained the tape, whereas the
recipient in Bartnicki did not know the identity.58 Judge Sentelle dissented, arguing that
the majority’s distinction was without legal or constitutional significance.59
The Government relies heavily on the majority in Boehner II in defending its AIPAC
prosecution against Rosen and Weissman’s claim that Bartnicki provides First
Amendment protection for their legal receipt of the information. How the Supreme Court
eventually resolves this issue has a big potential impact on any Espionage Act
prosecutions against news organizations. In some instances, journalists know that
information or documents they are receiving are secret and that their source is violating
the law in providing the documents. Under the view of the BoehnerII majority and the
government in the AIPAC prosecution, the journalist would be legally culpable and
without First Amendment protection if he or she had reason to believe the information
was illegally obtained or was illegally disclosed. The full D.C. Circuit is hearing the
appeal in Boehner II, and recently ordered a second argument on the issue of whether
U.S. v. Aguilar60 limited McDermott’s First Amendment protection. In Aguilar the Court
found that “Government officials in sensitive confidential positions may have special
duties of nondisclosure.”61 In Aguilar a federal judge was found to have a special duty
not to disclose a secret wiretap, even after the wiretap had expired. A decision depriving
Rep. McDermott of First Amendment protection because of his special duties as a
member of Congress on the Ethics Committee, might not hurt journalists, who have no
such duties.
Journalists might have more difficulty distinguishing themselves from Rosen and
Weissman, the AIPAC lobbyists. Judge Ellis, in an opinion that is respectful of First
Amendment values, points to the dicta in the Pentagon Papers case as indicating that the
Espionage Act could be used to prosecute newspapers.62 Judge Ellis decided in a pretrial
opinion that the Espionage Act could be saved from vagueness and overbreadth
challenges by imposing a thick judicial gloss that includes a specific intent requirement
and narrows the meaning of “information relating to the national defense.”63 He
summarized this judicial gloss in this passage:
“To prove that the information is related to the national defense, the government must
prove: (1) that the information relates to the nation's military activities, intelligence
gathering or foreign policy, (2) that the information is closely held by the government, in
that it does not exist in the public domain; and (3) that the information is such that its
disclosure could cause injury to the nation's security. To prove that the information was
57
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transmitted to one not entitled to receive it, the government must prove that a validly
promulgated executive branch regulation or order restricted the disclosure of information
to a certain set of identifiable people, and that the defendant delivered the information to
a person outside this set. In addition, the government must also prove that the person
alleged to have violated these provisions knew the nature of the information, knew that
the person with whom they were communicating was not entitled to the information, and
knew that such communication was illegal, but proceeded nonetheless. Finally, with
respect only to intangible information, the government must prove that the defendant had
a reason to believe that the disclosure of the information could harm the United States or
aid a foreign nation, which the Supreme Court has interpreted as a requirement of bad
faith.”64
Judge Ellis had to use strong judicial medicine to save the Espionage Act for the AIPAC
prosecution. Would that judicial prescription save the law for a prosecution against a
news organization? The Espionage Act was written at the dawn of modern First
Amendment doctrine. At the time the law was written, the Supreme Court had never
declared a law to be an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment. The
Government’s position in the AIPAC case is blind to the remarkable development of First
Amendment doctrine since passage of the Espionage Act.65 The government argued that
the First Amendment was not even implicated by the AIPAC case, citing Schenck v.
U.S.66 Schenck is a thoroughly discredited, if unanimous decision in which the Court
upheld the espionage conviction of pamphleteers opposing the draft. For the government
to base its argument on such an antiquated holding calls its legal approach into serious
question.
Ninety years of First Amendment development together with 90 years of history during
which the Espionage Act has not been used against a newspaper or journalist combine to
form a powerful historical argument against any such prosecution. That argument seems
especially potent in the face of the shrinking political capital available to the Bush
administration in the wake of the 2006 Congressional election and the difficulties with
the war in Iraq.
B. Crying wolf on national security
At the same time that journalists have exaggerated their place in the constitutional
constellation, government officials have exaggerated the damage to national security
caused by the publication of national security secrets. The 11-drop dead secrets in
Solicitor General Griswold’s secret brief to the Supreme Court appeared on their face to
be so sensitive that they might derail U.S. peace talks and prolong the Vietnam War with
increased American casualties.67 The brief claimed that volumes of the papers disclose:
64

Id.
Government’s Supplemental Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Superceding Indictment,
U.S. v. Rosen, 445 F.Supp.2d 602, 608 (E.D. Va. 2006)..
66
Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
67
Brief for the United States (Secret Portion), New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
65

14

1. Diplomatic attempts to open negotiations with the North Vietnamese, disclosure
of which could derail peace negotiations and delay peace.68
2. Derogatory comments offensive to U.S. allies in the war, particularly South
Korea, Thailand and Australia.69
3. The names and activities of CIA agents “still active in Southeast Asia” as well as
references to activities of the National Security Agency.70
4. Contingency plans of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) to block
the lower panhandle of Laos.71
5. Information on U.S. intelligence capabilities that could reveal U.S. estimates on
how the Soviet Union would react under various situations.72
6. The judgment of the U.S. Intelligence Board on the Soviet capability to supply
weapons to the North, the disclosure of which could lead to “serious
consequences.”73
7. The U.S. consideration of a nuclear response against China if the Chinese
attacked Thailand for its involvement in the war.74
8. A 1968 cable to Washington by then-ambassador to Moscow Llewellyn C.
Thompson making predictions on likely Soviet response to mining Haiphong
harbor or possibly invading North Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia.75
9. Discussions of possible South Vietnamese military action in Laos.76
10. The successes that the United States had in communications intelligence,
revealing U.S. capabilities to the enemy.77
11. Confidential diplomatic communications that would endanger the lives of
prisoners of war. “The longer prisoners are held, the more will die,” the
Government said.78
These 11-drop-dead secrets involve sensitive subjects about which the Government has a
strong interest – diplomatic initiatives, names of secret agents, intelligence estimates and
capabilities and military contingency plans. The Government claimed that disclosure of
the Pentagon Papers could endanger the lives of intelligence agents and prolong the war,
with the resulting death of thousands more soldiers and many more prisoners of war. In
many ways, these claims seem more tangible than the claims that the Bush administration
has made about the consequences of press disclosures of NSA wiretaps and secret CIA
prisons. But the verdict of history is that the disclosure of the papers was in the public
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interest and did not harm national security. Mr. Griswold himself later said, “I have never
seen any trace of a threat to the national security from publication.”79
The Bush administration’s claims about the damage of publishing secrets have not
involved the same kind of detail offered by the United States in the Pentagon Papers case.
President Bush made a widely reported warning to New York Times editors on Dec. 5,
2005 that they would have “blood on their hands” if they published the NSA secret
wiretapping story.80 Happily, that warning has not become a reality. The Bush
administration has not offered proof of any significant damage to national security from
publication of national security secrets during the war on terror. At a meeting this year,
Kenneth L. Wainstein, Assistant Attorney General for the National Security Division,
spoke of experiences he had in criminal cases in which leaks damaged a Justice
Department investigation; but Mr. Wainstein’s main examples did not involve national
security cases.81 Mr. Wainstein’s national security examples included two old, wellpublicized cases - the Chicago Tribune’s 1942 disclosure that the United States had
broken the Japanese code and the disclosure in the 1970s of CIA agents’ names by
former CIA employee Philip Agee. The one recent example cited by Mr. Wainstein was
stories and telephone calls by Times reporters Judith Miller and Philip Shenon in 2001
that tipped off two Islamic charities that their assets might be frozen by the government.82
No claim was made that lives were jeopardized.
This isn’t to say that press disclosures of government secrets are never potentially
damaging. The Chicago Tribune story about the Japanese code could have had serious
repercussions but the Japanese apparently missed it.83 Historically, the press has refused
to publish information about breaking codes, CIA agents’ identities, troop movements, or
other military plans that could risk American lives. The widely reported New York Times
decisions not to disclose the Bay of Pigs invasion or the American discovery of missiles
in Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis are two examples of the discretion exercised by
the press.
II. An ethical approach
If the law fails to provide a tidy answer to questions surrounding the press’ right to print
national security secrets, might an ethics approach provide a more fulfilling framework?
For decades, journalists were keen to hold other professions to ethical standards, but
eschewed developing their own ethics for fear of being held to them in courts of law.
The development of ethical standards for newsrooms is essentially a post-Pentagon
Papers development.
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Journalism ethicists often use a decision-making device called the Potter Box for making
ethical decisions. This method of ethical decision-making is named after Harvard
theologian Ralph Potter. It is called a box because it teases the question into four
separate parts, each represented by one quadrant of a square. One quadrant is for the
facts. A second is for values – from human values such as compassion, fairness, equality
and freedom of expression to journalistic values about providing information that helps
readers understand the world. A third box is for principles. Some of these principles
relate directly to journalism, such as truth-telling and the watch-dog function of the press.
Other principles are more universal, such as Kant’s categorical imperative, the Golden
Mean, the Golden Rule. The fourth box is loyalties - to citizens, readers, advertisers,
civic leaders etc. Like other decision-making devices, the result of a Potter Box analysis
depends on how one lays out the facts and how one weighs competing principles, values
and loyalties.
If the Golden Mean, the Golden Rule or the Categorical Imperative trump journalistic
values, then the Potter Box would suggest that editors should withhold publication. The
middle ground of the Golden Mean wouldn’t be to publish; the do unto others instruction
of the Golden Rule would suggest that newspapers wouldn’t print government secrets
because they wouldn’t want the government to disclose reporters’ secrets. The
Categorical Imperative does not comfortably support a universal rule that the press
should print national security secrets.
But if journalistic principles of truth-telling, independence and watchdog reporting hold
sway over the more formalistic principles, then the answer that the Potter Box cranks out
is to publish. The ethical codes of such leading journalistic organizations as the
Associated Press Managing Editors, the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE)
and the Society of Professional Journalists emphasize truth-telling, independence and
watchdog journalism. “The public’s right to know about matters of importance is
paramount,” says the Code of Ethics of the Associated Press Managing Editors. “The
newspaper has a special responsibility as surrogate of its readers to be a vigilant
watchdog of their legitimate public interests…..Truth is its guiding interest.” The Society
of Professional Journalists says, “Seek truth and report it,” and “Act independently.”
ASNE says, “The American press was made free…to bring an independent scrutiny to
bear on the forces of power in the society, including the conduct of official power at all
levels of government…..Freedom of the press….must be guarded against encroachment
or assault from any quarter, public or private.” Granted the ethics codes include values
about responsibility and minimizing harm and public accountability. But the principles
of disclosure, truth-seeking, independence and watchdog reporting are paramount.
An attempt to apply both journalistic and universal principles might result in the kind of
action that the Times and Post followed in the NSA and CIA stories – to delay
publication or to withhold important details that could be damaging to U.S. security. To
the Bush administration, these solutions are hardly a Golden Mean. But they do represent
an effort to minimize harm while performing the press’s central function of public
disclosure and debate.
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Editors, reporters and journalism deans often do a poor job of explaining their decisions
to print national security secrets. When a panel of reporters at a recent dinner of the
Media Law Resource Center was asked why they printed secrets about NSA wiretapping,
Abu Ghraib torture and CIA black prisons, one blurted out, “Because we got it.”84
Blunt, glib answers of that kind aren’t exactly the thoughtful kind of explanation that the
press owes when it decides to print government secrets.
Editors and journalism deans sometimes don’t do much better. The views of five top
academics85 were summarized in a letter published in the Washington Post under the
headline, “When in Doubt, Publish.”86 “It is the business – and the responsibility – of the
press to reveal secrets,”87 the piece began. The academics go on to construct a more
nuanced argument. Still, in the end, their decision boils down to this formulation: “We
believe that in the case of a close case, the press should publish when editors are
convinced that more damage will be done to our democratic society by keeping
information away from the American people than by leveling with them.”88
The editors of the New York Times and Los Angeles Times published a written
explanation of their decision last summer to publish details of the Bush administration’s
program to monitor international banking transactions.89 They noted that the Bush
administration itself had tried to obtain favorable publicity for the program several
months before it was disclosed. They also pointed out that they always give the
government time to make its case that publication could risk lives. The Times’ NSA
surveillance story was held more than a year, Keller said, until Times editors became
convinced that the program might be illegal. The Washington Post’s CIA prison stories
also made accommodations with the government by cutting out mention of the names of
the countries that allowed the prisons within their borders.90 Keller and Baquet closed by
reasserting their independence and right to make these decisions on their own, without
government intervention.
As a former journalist I understand this gut feeling that the press’ default position should
be to publish. But the academics’ formulation raises questions that journalists have not
done well answering: If journalists are not specially qualified to evaluate national security
information and do not have security clearances, what makes them qualified to make the
national security judgment that is part of the calculus of determining if society will be
better off if the secret is disclosed? If the decision to publish rests on the editors’
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judgment of the legality of the government action, as Keller said the Times’ NSA story
did, is the ultimate decision one to be made by lawyers and not editors?” And, finally,
how do reporters and editors defend themselves against the accusation that they hold
themselves above the law when they decide what is legal and what is not and when they
refuse to provide information to the courts about the sources of illegal leaks?
Edgar and Schmidt pointed out at the time of the Pentagon Papers that the aggressive
stance of the press represented a new assertiveness and “demonstrated that much of the
press was no longer willing to be merely an occasionally critical associate devoted to
common aims, but intended to become an adversary….”91 Edgar and Schmidt wrote that
this new role was a “necessary counterweight to the increasing concentration of the
power of the government in the hands of the Executive Branch.”92 Justice Stewart’
opinion in the Pentagon Papers case had made a similar point when he wrote:
“In the governmental structure created by our Constitution, the Executive is endowed
with enormous power in the two related areas of national defense and international
relations. This power, largely unchecked by the Legislative and Judicial branches, has
been pressed to the very hilt since the advent of the nuclear missile age. For better or for
worse, the simple fact is that a President of the United States possesses vastly greater
constitutional independence in these two vital areas of power than does, say, a prime
minister of a country with a parliamentary form of government. In the absence of the
governmental checks and balances present in other areas of our national life, the only
effective restraint upon executive policy and power in the areas of national defense and
international affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry--in an informed and critical public
opinion which alone can here protect the values of democratic government. For this
reason, it is perhaps here that a press that is alert, aware, and free most vitally serves the
basic purpose of the First Amendment. For without an informed and free press there
cannot be an enlightened people.”93
These words have even more force three decades later at a time when the Bush-Cheney
administration asserted executive power to its limit and beyond at the same time that the
administration’s party controlled Congress and when the opposition was easily cowed by
administration claims of weakness in the war on terror. The national security secrets
disclosed by the Times and by the Post relate directly that abuse of executive power.
Under the circumstances that have existed during the first six years of the Bush
administration, it has been checks from unelected judges and journalists that have
provided the main counterbalance to runaway executive authority.
Conclusion
James Goodale, the former Times lawyer involved in the Pentagon Papers case, told a
conference of journalists and lawyers in 2006 that they should “fight like tigers” to
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protect their First Amendment freedoms.94 In light of the hostile legal environment, the
uncertain protection offered by the Free Flow of Information Act and the continuing
threat posed by the Espionage Act, the press might find it is better off with guerrilla legal
tactics than fighting the set piece war to win a legal precedent that is beyond reach.
Reporters can make sure they don’t type sensitive notes on company computers, that they
destroy notes as soon as possible, and that they remember not to write down sources’
names. Media companies can bundle phone systems to mask calls to individual reporters.
And when reporters are jailed their employers can use their ink and kilowatts on behalf of
the reporter’s freedom. As unappealing as journalists may seem at times, nearly 6 in 10
Americans believe that journalists should protect confidential sources even under court
order to disclose them.95 In light of this reservoir of understanding from the public, a
government prosecution of a journalist for violation of the Espionage Act would be
difficult to bring.
Professor Alexander Bickel, who argued the Pentagon Papers case before the Supreme
Court on behalf of the New York Times, wrote afterwards that the press was less free after
the case than before because “law can never make us as secure as we are when we do not
need it. Those freedoms which are neither challenged nor defined are the most secure.”96
Professor Bickel called this absence of clear boundaries between freedom and secrecy a
“disorderly situation” but suggested, that like democracy, this disorder was better than the
likely alternative.97 Edgar and Schmidt called this a situation of “benign indeterminacy.”
It just may be that press freedom may flourish better in this disorderly state of
indeterminacy than in a courtroom filled with ringing rhetoric about the First
Amendment.
In rare instances, it may not be possible to square the circle and a journalist will have to
go to jail. Just as it wasn't possible to make all of the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr.’s
tactics legal, it may not be possible to make every important tactic of a reporter legal.
Some may say this amounts to journalists arrogating themselves as above the law. But as
long as the journalist is willing to submit to the consequences that criticism loses its
force. In the end, there may be instances in which the journalist's highest calling and the
command of journalistic ethics require a journalist to disclose national security secrets
crucial to public debate even if that means violating the law or going to jail.
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